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ABSTRACT 
The public goods nature of climate mitigation – which means that costs are borne by a few, but 
benefits are enjoyed by many – frustrates concerted international collective action. Results-based 
payments (RBPs), which involve a funder who agrees to make payments to agents for achieving pre-
agreed, verified results, are a unique approach that can potentially address these misaligned 
incentives at the heart of the climate challenge. They can do so by making payments to service 
providers or to beneficiaries contingent on achieving specific outcomes that deliver public benefits 
for the global commons. Such approaches are also applicable in adaptation interventions. This paper 
presents an evidence review on the effectiveness of RBPs in non-Annex I settings and low-income 
contexts in Annex I countries (which are the groupings of developing and developed countries, 
respectively, within the context of the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change). It synthesizes insights from a wide range of sectors to enhance the application 
of results-based approaches in the climate domain. 
The evidence review presents a systematic, multisectoral search of publications in the academic and 
grey literature. The search was restricted to quantitative studies published between 2000 and 2020 
that assessed the effectiveness of one or more RBP interventions using experimental, quasi-
experimental or non-causal designs. Based on sector-, intervention- and implementation-related 
characteristics extracted from a sample of 428 studies that met these inclusion/exclusion criteria, we 
developed an evidence gap map (EGM). The EGM followed a consistent intervention/outcome 
framework to highlight the distribution of the evidence base on the impacts of various RBP 
interventions on beneficiary-, service-provider- and investor/system-level outcomes. 
The EGM reveals that vouchers, pay-for-performance models, payments for environmental services 
and conditional cash transfers have been extensively studied, whereas the evidence base on broader 
RBP modalities is much thinner. It highlights regional patterns in the use of these modalities: most 
evidence comes from North America, East Asia and Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America 
and the Caribbean. Evidence from South Asia and especially from the Middle East and North Africa 
was limited. Nearly half the evidence across all countries is drawn from applications in the health 
sector, followed by agriculture and forestry, and education; evidence on RBPs in the energy sector is 
sorely lacking. 
Using the same intervention/outcome framework, we developed an intervention heat map (IHM) 
that highlights the distribution of 15 approved financial commitments by the Green Climate Fund 
(GCF) that employ results-based modalities. Nearly all this amount (representing approximately 7 
per cent of the GCF’s total commitments between 2015 and 2020) was allocated as part of the 
GCF’s REDD+ pilot programme, which rewards countries for achieving verified emissions 
reductions from forestry programmes. 
A comparison of the EGM and the IHM reveals that there is potential for greater use of results-
based approaches in the GCF’s funding portfolio, including the use of vouchers and conditional cash 
transfers, which have already been deployed in GCF-supported projects. In addition, there is 
considerable potential to (i) broaden the GCF’s existing RBP-based commitments to projects to 
enhance beneficiaries’ adaptive capacity and to ensure long-term sustainability of project impacts, 
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A. INTRODUCTION 
Climate change is a defining policy challenge of the twenty-first century. This section begins with a 
description of the seemingly intractable nature of the climate challenge. Next, it provides an 
overview of results-based payments (RBPs) and highlights their potential to accelerate progress on 
global climate goals. The section concludes with a summary of the objectives of this evidence 
review. 
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM: THE CLIMATE CHALLENGE 
Recent assessments of trajectories for carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions suggest that global average temperatures will likely increase by approximately 3°C over 
pre-industrial levels by the year 2100 (Hausfather & Peters, 2020). A growing body of work 
highlights the substantial negative impacts of such warming. Climate change is likely to negatively 
affect incomes and economic growth (Burke and others, 2015; Newell and others, 2017), food 
security (Mbow and others, 2019), public health (Carleton and others, 2020), conflict (Hsiang and 
others, 2013) and natural ecosystems (Hoegh-Guldberg & Bruno, 2010). 
The international community has responded to this challenge in a variety of ways. Global treaties 
such as the Paris Agreement on climate change have sought to establish emissions mitigation targets 
and foster international consensus and coordinated climate action. At the same time, national and 
subnational initiatives have complemented (and sometimes outpaced) international action (e.g. Hsu 
and others, 2018; International Energy Agency, 2020). However, climate change mitigation is a 
public good, which frustrates concerted international collective action. Firstly, each country’s 
emissions cumulatively increase global GHG concentrations, while climate impacts are often 
distributed unequally. This implies that each country’s abatement efforts necessarily entail higher 
national costs than national benefits. Additionally, unlike other environmental challenges, the effects 
of climate change will be fully realized farther out in the future. These delayed impacts further 
dampen enthusiasm for decisive action because humans discount the value of a later reward. 
Large regional disparities in who has contributed most to global emissions so far, who will drive 
emissions growth going forward and who stands to bear the brunt of resulting climate damages pose 
challenges for designing equitable climate policies. More impoverished regions, in particular, have 
lower levels of emissions-generating economic activity relative to wealthier regions. As shown in 
Figure 1a, which presents Climate Watch (2018) data on annual regional emissions, sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia each contributed less than 10 per cent of global emissions in 2016. In 
addition, Figure 1b shows that each region’s share of cumulative global emissions was even lower 
(Ritchie & Roser, 2017). Yet countries in these regions will bear a disproportionate burden of future 
damages. For example, projections suggest that climate change will reduce agricultural yields in 
sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia by up to 25 per cent by the year 2080; yields in the wealthier, 
northern latitude countries of Europe and North America, in contrast, are expected to increase 
(European Environment Agency, 2010). At the same time, relatively poor regions will drive future 
emissions growth in a variety of sectors as incomes increase. Over the next three decades, for 
instance, nearly all the growth in energy demand and associated GHG emissions is forecast to come 
from low- and middle-income countries (Wolfram and others, 2012). 
- Evidence review on results-based payments: Evidence gap map and intervention heat map - 
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Figure 1. Regional emissions patterns 
 
Source: For panel (a): Climate Watch (2018); for panel (b): Ritchie & Roser (2017) 
Notes: EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the 
Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; NAR = North America; SAR = South Asia; SSA 
= sub-Saharan Africa; GHG = greenhouse gas; Mt = metric megatons; MtCO2e = metric megatons of 
carbon dioxide equivalent. 
“Energy” in panel (a) includes (i) building; (ii) electricity/heat; (iii) fugitive emissions; (iv) 
manufacturing/construction; (v) other fuel combustion; and (vi) transportation. 
Panel (b) reports CO₂ emissions from fossil fuels and cement production only; land-use change is not 
included. 
- Evidence review on results-based payments: Evidence gap map and intervention heat map - 
©IEU  |  3 
It is increasingly clear that current efforts are insufficient. Absent dramatic reductions in annual 
GHG emissions brought on by innovation and technology adoption, behaviour change and policy 
reform, the international community is unlikely to limit warming to 1.5°C relative to pre-industrial 
temperatures, a central objective of the Paris Agreement (Rogelj and others, 2016). Several policy 
tools and interventions (such as a carbon tax or a global emissions trading scheme) can help drive 
progress towards meeting these ambitious emissions goals (e.g. Goulder & Schein, 2013). However, 
breakthrough solutions are needed to bridge the gap between what is needed and what business-as-
usual approaches will achieve. RBPs are a unique approach that holds promise. This modality 
addresses the misaligned incentives at the heart of the climate challenge by making payments to 
service providers or to beneficiaries contingent on achieving specific activities, outputs or outcomes 
that deliver public benefits for the global commons. They also leverage the creativity and 
investment of multiple actors, who are free to try different approaches to achieve the same outcome. 
2. RESULTS-BASED PAYMENTS: POTENTIAL TO LEVERAGE INCENTIVES FOR 
CLIMATE ACTION 
An RBP contract involves a funder who agrees to make payments to agents for achieving pre-
agreed, verified results.1 In so doing, RBPs convene multiple agents (often in competition with each 
other) to achieve outcomes and in the process: 
• Align agent-level incentives, thereby partly addressing the market failures that prevent the 
emergence of well-functioning markets for welfare-improving goods, services and innovations; 
• Increase accountability by linking financing more directly to desired outcomes rather than 
specific inputs or outputs, which may be ineffectual or ill-suited for local contexts, thereby 
increasing funding effectiveness and lowering risks for funders; 
• Foster autonomy to innovate and adapt by letting agents pick the inputs and processes needed 
to achieve desired results; and 
• Crowd-in resources of agents that take on the challenge to achieve the pre-specified outcomes, 
whether by labour effort they provide or monetary funding to support their effort. 
There can be considerable variation in how particular RBP interventions structure, target and deliver 
incentive payments (see Table 1 for a summary of the key RBP interventions that are the focus of 
this evidence review). These differences have important implications for how various interventions 
potentially generate competition, alter the risk–reward payoff for participants and foster nascent 
markets for beneficial goods and services (Mainville & Narayan, 2017). For instance, grand 
challenges (such as the XPRIZE) are often structured as winner-take-all competitions designed to 
incentivize innovation and technological breakthroughs. Because only one prize is typically 
awarded, grand challenges place relatively higher levels of risk on participants, which can limit 
participation to those who have the resources needed to make large investments in research and 
development and take on additional risk. In contrast, payments for environmental services (PES), 
which are offered to farmers or landowners in exchange for managing land in ways that provide 
environmental benefits, are typically awarded to multiple beneficiaries who achieve the pre-
specified outcome and are not in any competition with one another. This incentive structure makes 
them uniquely suited to encouraging the adoption and uptake of existing products and practices. It is 
worth noting, however, that despite this important difference, both approaches bring to bear the 
creativity and resources of multiple actors on achieving the desired outcome. Specifically, these 
 
1 Although RBP contracts can also involve a single agent, in this evidence review we focus principally on those that 
incentivize multiple entities at the same time, with the exception of impact bonds that do not require multiple agents. 
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mechanisms foster creativity by giving the agents considerable freedom in how they achieve desired 
outcomes. 
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INCENTIVE STRUCTURE KEY FEATURES, INCLUDING EXAMPLES OF USE, COMPETITION, PRICING AND RESOURCES 
Supply side Grand challenge Donor pays out a grand prize to typically 
one winner upon achieving a pre-specified 
outcome. 
• Typically used for technology development (e.g. climate-resilient houses) 
• Puts multiple agents in competition with each other 
• Places high risk on competitors because only one (or few) prizes are awarded 
• Encourages participation of agents that have resources for initial investment and 
the ability to take the higher risk of not winning a prize (because only one or few 
prizes are awarded) 
• May lead to monopolistic pricing of innovation, especially if only one prize is 
awarded 
• Increases pool of resources to solve the problem 
Advance market 
commitment 
Donor makes a binding agreement to 
purchase or subsidize the purchase of a pre-
specified quantity of the innovation if it 
meets predefined characteristics. 
• Used for technology development (e.g. vaccines) 
• Puts multiple agents in competition with each other 
• Encourages participation of agents that have resources for initial investment and 
ability to take the higher risk (because products of only the winners are 
purchased) 
• Limits monopolistic pricing because donors set the price at which product is 
purchased 
• Increases pool of resources to solve the problem 
• Risk of donor reneging on agreement (Leoni, 2019) 
Impact bond Investors and donors enter a contract that 
prespecifies the outcomes to be achieved by 
the investment and the payment schedule by 
which donors repay the investors if the 
project achieves pre-specified social 
outcomes. 
• Used for service delivery rather than innovation 
• Does not typically put several agents in competition 
• Focused on investors and service providers 
• Increases pool of resources (from investors) to solve the problem 
• “One-buyer-one-provider” model that does not involve competition 
• Independent verification methods are required to ensure outcomes are achieved 
• Provides flexibility to the service providers in designing how the outcomes are 
delivered 
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Donor (or other entity benefiting from the 
actions) pays agents if and only if they take 
actions that improve environmental 
outcomes (e.g. planting trees). 
• Used for encouraging beneficiary adoption of existing products and services; 
reduces their risk of adoption 
• Prizes awarded to multiple agents (beneficiaries), but the agents are not in 
competition with each other 
• Independent verification methods are required to ensure outcomes are achieved 




Donor offers financial incentives to service 
providers for meeting certain performance 
measures (e.g. efficiency, quality). 
• Used for improving quantity/quality of service delivery by linking compensation 
to pre-specified performance targets 
• Brings in multiple actors, but not in direct competition 
• Can also be used to penalize poor outcomes 
• Typically focuses on intermediary inputs/processes/practices rather than final 
outcomes 
Hybrid Pull mechanism Market incentivization prize that pays 
private sector agents if they sell products 
that meet pre-specified characteristics and 
sale agreements. Payments can be per unit of 
sale or proportional to sale relative to other 
sellers, with or without milestone prizes that 
are awarded to a limited number of agents. 
• Simultaneously incentivizes supply and demand of the technology through agent 
effort to increase sale of technology 
• Used for encouraging adoption of products and services 
• Aims to address market failure that otherwise limits development of market for a 
technology 
• Puts multiple agents in varying degrees of competition with each other depending 
on specific incentive structure (proportional, per unit, with or without milestone 
prizes) 
• Increases pool of resources (from investors) to solve the problem 
• Aims to create a market for the technology 
• Independent verification methods are required to ensure outcomes are achieved 
• Provides flexibility to the service providers in designing how the outcomes are 
delivered 
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INCENTIVE STRUCTURE KEY FEATURES, INCLUDING EXAMPLES OF USE, COMPETITION, PRICING AND RESOURCES 
Voucher Donor commits to reimburse accredited 
providers on the basis of services delivered 
to voucher recipients. 
• Simultaneously incentivizes supply and demand of the technology through agent 
effort to increase the use of vouchers 
• Focused on increased delivery and adoption of services 
• Brings in multiple actors, but not in direct competition 
• Increases pool of resources 
Demand side Conditional cash 
transfer 
Donor promises monetary transfers to 
families, conditional on those households 
taking pre-agreed actions that improve 
social outcomes (e.g. sending children to 
school). 
• Focused on adoption of services by beneficiaries 
• Beneficiaries are typically not in direct competition with each other if there is 
adequate supply of services available on the basis of which cash awards are made, 
and as long there is adequate supply of resources for providing cash transfers 
• Does not increase pool of resources except through households’ efforts to utilize 
socially beneficial services 
• Independent verification methods are required to ensure outcomes are achieved 
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The different types of RBPs presented in Table 1 can be broadly classified into three groups based 
on the identity of the targeted agent. Specifically, supply-side RBPs alter the incentives for service 
providers to increase the supply of beneficial goods and services. Advance market commitments, for 
instance, are RBP contracts under which funders promise to purchase a predetermined quantity of a 
desired good or service (such as a vaccine) if and when one is developed. This contract lowers the 
private sector’s risks associated with investing in high-cost research and development by creating a 
viable market for innovations. Demand-side incentives, in contrast, target final beneficiaries directly 
to increase demand and promote the consumption of beneficial goods and services. Conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs), for instance, are incentives offered to households or individuals in exchange for 
consuming social services that improve socioeconomic and demographic outcomes. Finally, hybrid 
incentives combine characteristics of both supply- and demand-side mechanisms. Pull mechanisms 
are an example of such a hybrid tool, which can incentivize sales of beneficial goods and services by 
private sector service providers. Specifically, by linking incentive payments to verified sales, pull 
mechanisms encourage service providers to increase their capacity to supply targeted goods or 
services while also engaging in activities to identify and invigorate demand among potential end 
users and customers. 
There is emerging evidence that the use of RBPs has broken down implementation barriers and 
driven progress on intractable social challenges in diverse sectors. An initial review of evidence 
suggests that the literature is rich for RBPs in the health sector (Audit Commission 2005; Brenzel 
and others 2009; Eichler and others, 2013; Eldridge & Palmer, 2009; Gorter and others, 2013; 
Mendelson and others, 2017; Renmans and others, 2016; Renwick and others, 2016; Suthar and 
others, 2017; Turcotte-Tremblay and others, 2016; Mueller-Langer, 2013). In particular, CCTs 
deployed as part of national health systems have increased the use of preventive and maternal health 
services and have improved health outcomes (Gertler, 2004; Lagarde and others 2007; Owusu-Addo 
& Cross, 2014). In the education sector, the use of CCTs has increased enrolment and attendance, 
although the evidence on impacts on learning outcomes is weaker (Baird and others, 2014). 
Similarly, vouchers provided to low-income households and individuals – including in high-income 
settings – have enhanced access to housing, educational and health services; increased competition 
among service providers; and improved a host of socioeconomic outcomes (Bellows and others, 
2010; Kling and others, 2005; Sandström & Bergström, 2005). 
Results-based mechanisms have also been used to deliver climate finance (World Bank Group & 
Frankfurt School of Finance and Management, 2017). In particular, PES delivered through projects 
based on afforestation/reforestation; improved forest management; Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation Plus Conservation, Sustainable Management of Forests, and 
Enhancement of Forest Carbon Stocks (REDD+); and sustainable agriculture have become a key 
modality through which funders pursue climate goals. Prior evidence reviews have assessed the 
potential of PES (Snilstveit and others 2019; Samii and others 2014) and applications for 
biodiversity conservation (Herzon and others 2018), but the literature is relatively limited. In 
addition, although the broader evidence base on the impacts of such payments on deforestation is 
mixed (Pattanayak and others, 2010), recent rigorous evaluations point to their potential to 
significantly increase forest cover (Arriagada and others, 2012; Jayachandran and others, 2017). 
Applications of RBPs in the energy sector – where they have been deployed to incentivize the 
adoption, sale and use of climate-friendly energy technologies and to promote innovation across the 
energy supply chain – are also common (Vivid Economics, 2013). 
There is promise in the potential of RBPs to drive climate action, yet lessons from a multisectoral, 
loosely linked literature make it difficult to distil clear insights. This evidence review takes stock of 
the disparate evidence base on the effectiveness of RBPs across all sectors. In so doing, it 
- Evidence review on results-based payments: Evidence gap map and intervention heat map - 
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synthesizes actionable insights for the enhanced application of RBPs to effectively meet 
international climate goals. 
B. METHODS 
In this section, we first present the meta-theory of change that guided our evidence review. We then 
outline our intervention/outcome framework, which was informed by the theory of change. Next, we 
present the evidence review’s inclusion/exclusion criteria and describe the search strategy we used 
to search for and identify the relevant literature. Finally, we detail the literature coding, extraction 
and analysis process we used to generate the evidence gap maps and intervention heat map that 
provide insights on the distribution of the broader RBP literature and on the Green Climate Fund’s 
RBP investments, respectively. 
1. META-THEORY OF CHANGE 
The meta-theory of change (meta-TOC) shown in Figure 2 highlights the key pathways through 
which the deployment of RBPs alters incentives and promotes the delivery of key outputs, which in 
turn determines intermediate and final outcomes at the service-provider, beneficiary, investor and 
system-wide levels. 2 These causal pathways start with the recognition that supply-side, demand-
side, and hybrid RBP interventions target and influence distinct groups of actors/agents and 
beneficiaries through their distinctive incentive structures. As noted previously, supply-side RBPs 
exclusively target service providers. The supply-side RBPs work by increasing the expected returns 
to service providers from investing in either the development of or sale of a socially beneficially 
good or service. In doing so, the RBPs address underlying market failures, such as lack of awareness 
of the technology by potential consumers or poor distribution networks. These RBPs incentivize 
investments in capital infrastructure, operational process and/or management judged necessary by 
the service provider to achieve desired outcomes. Different types of supply-side RBP interventions 
entail different levels of competition and risk for participants, and thus can be used to incentivize 
distinct types of outcomes and market structures (e.g. incentive structures that reward multiple 
agents favour the development of a competitive market for the technology). In addition, if the 
targeted service provider is a policymaker or public-sector agency, a supply-side RBP intervention 
may also be deployed to incentivize output-level investments to bring about policy reform. Because 
a key advantage of RBP tools is that investments in outputs are left to the discretion of the service 
provider, such changes typically go unobserved by funders. Nevertheless, they constitute a crucial 
piece of the causal chain linking the intervention, implementation and results. 
Hybrid investments (such as pull mechanisms) share some of these characteristics, but because they 
incentivize the sale of products or services by service providers, they simultaneously invigorate 
supply (directly) and demand (indirectly) because a sale requires that demand is expressed. On the 
other hand, demand-side RBPs are targeted exclusively at beneficiaries to promote increased 
consumption of existing goods and services and thus do not incentivize output-level investments by 
service providers. These RBPs aim to increase the expected utility of adopting the technology by 
offering a cash reward, thereby addressing underlying market failures that limit adoption. 
Moving through the causal chain, the meta-TOC highlights how output-level investments induced 
by supply-side and hybrid RBPs yield interim outcomes – namely, increased supply and quality of 
 
2 Service providers are public or private sector agents who deliver goods and services to potential end-users. Depending on 
the context, this can include a variety of actors (such as agricultural extension agents promoting a particular agricultural 
practice, local secondary schools, health clinics, and grocery stores). Beneficiaries are the agents that an intervention 
ultimately seeks to benefit, either directly or indirectly (e.g. school-age youth, farmers). Investors include public or private 
sector agents who provide funding, management, and/or oversight for an intervention (e.g. bilateral/multilateral 
development agency, private foundation, government agency). 
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goods and services and, if relevant, the introduction of desired policy reforms. The meta-TOC also 
outlines the links between interim outcomes at the service-provider and beneficiary levels. Increased 
supply of goods and services by service providers, for instance, gives rise to increased awareness 
and access by beneficiaries (e.g. through service provider investments in marketing or distribution 
networks), which can itself be induced by the deployment of demand-side incentives targeted at 
beneficiaries. 
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Figure 2. Meta-theory of change 
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Interim outcomes subsequently yield sustained outcomes for both service providers and 
beneficiaries. Increased awareness, for instance, is likely to increase adoption of, as well as demand 
for, the goods and services targeted by beneficiaries, which in turn leads to increased revenues for 
service providers. This self-reinforcing interplay between service providers and beneficiaries is 
central to how intermediate outcomes yield ultimate results, which are often what RBP interventions 
aim to drive. Accordingly, the meta-TOC in Figure 2 highlights illustrative sectoral examples of 
outcomes in the health, education, agriculture and forestry, and energy and environment sectors that 
have routinely been targeted by RBP interventions. Notably, the service providers, incentivized by 
the RBPs, may learn about the lack of acceptability of the technologies and tweak their products to 
increase take-up in their quest to obtain incentive payments. 
Sectoral RBP applications can also yield improved investor-level and system-wide outcomes. By 
linking payments directly to results, for instance, RBP interventions lower the risks donors, 
governments and other investors face, which has the potential to improve funding effectiveness. 
Bringing multiple actors to compete with each other also “crowds in” new sources of funding. By 
supporting the dissemination of innovations that improve well-being, RBP interventions also 
support the creation and expansion of markets for nascent goods and services. 
That said, it is worth noting that the same mechanism through which RBP interventions effectively 
alter and align incentives can also yield unintended consequences. Depending on how underlying 
incentive structures are designed, RBP tools may lead to overuse of targeted goods and services, 
sometimes in ways that lead to the neglect of other priority sectors. Similarly, an increase in demand 
for a good or service can increase its market price in the medium to long term, which in turn has 
equity implications for end users who do not receive incentives for consumption. Further, a focus on 
private sector actors to drive results may mean that they exclude the poorest beneficiaries, who face 
significant constraints in adopting technologies. 
The logic of RBP interventions is based on the assumption that goods, services and activities 
targeted by incentives will yield desired outcomes (e.g. forests left intact by PES recipients will 
sequester carbon). Underlying assumptions about the enabling environment, which determines the 
ways in which various actors respond to new incentives, are also crucial. These include 
complementary economic and political institutions that lend credence to the RBP contract between 
funders and agents; the availability of context-appropriate technologies and other resources that 
enable intermediate outputs to translate into final outcomes; compatible cultural norms and 
expectations that allow agents to respond to monetary incentives; and the ability to verify outcomes 
or results. In the absence of these foundational elements of the causal pathway, incentives alone are 
unlikely to be sufficient to drive transformational change. 
2. INTERVENTION/OUTCOME FRAMEWORK 
The meta-TOC described above directly influenced the structure of our intervention/outcome 
framework, which maps key RBP interventions directly onto outcomes at the beneficiary, service-
provider, investor and system-wide levels, as shown in the evidence gap maps and intervention heat 
map we develop below. This includes sector-specific outcomes (such as higher test scores among 
beneficiaries targeted by RBP interventions in the education sector), investments in outputs (such as 
efforts to improve management, supply chains or marketing efforts by service providers) as well as 
potentially unintended effects (such as the inefficient overuse of goods and services targeted by 
incentives). Specifically, three key priorities drive this structure: 
• Consistent mapping of interventions onto outcomes: The intervention/outcome framework 
connects the meta-TOC to the evidence gap maps and intervention heat map we develop using 
a consistent structure that highlights both outputs and intermediate and final outcomes. 
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• Recognition of the importance of different actors/agents and levels: The framework 
recognizes that supply-side, demand-side and hybrid RBP interventions alter incentives at 
various beneficiary, service-provider and investor-wide levels, thereby enabling us to 
systematically track the effectiveness of specific RBP interventions on outcomes at these 
differing levels. 
• Multisectoral tractability: Given the diverse sectors and domains within which RBPs have 
been deployed, we designed the intervention/outcomes framework with multisectoral 
tractability in mind – namely, that the ways in which it categorizes interventions and outcomes 
should be both sufficiently narrow to generate valuable insights about the distribution of 
evidence on the effects of RBPs and sufficiently broad to be easily adapted for analyses 
focused on sectors or interventions beyond those highlighted in the meta-TOC. 
3. INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
To systematically characterize a large, disparate literature on the effectiveness of RBPs, an 
underlying focus on breadth (e.g. across sectors, geographies and study methods) guided this 
evidence review’s scope. More formally, we relied on the PICOS (population, intervention, 
comparator, outcome and study design) model to precisely describe our inclusion/exclusion criteria 
below (see Appendix 1 for additional details). 
a. Population 
Following the country-level categorizations outlined in the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change, we included studies that assess the effectiveness of an RBP intervention in: 
• Non-Annex I countries; 
• Low-income contexts/settings (defined in relative terms) in Annex I countries; and 
• Non-Annex I and Annex I countries (jointly) if associated analyses distinguish effects and 
report results separately across the two samples. 
We excluded any study that presented a combined analysis on both non-Annex I and Annex I 
countries without reporting results across the two samples separately, unless the intervention was 
carried out in a low-income context/setting in an Annex I country. 
b. Interventions 
We included assessments of the effectiveness of RBP interventions: 
• Across all sectors; 
• Delivered at any administrative level; and 
• Delivered to any type of beneficiary (e.g. household, individual) by any type of actor (e.g. 
government, non-governmental organization). 
In addition, we also did not impose any restrictions related to intervention-level characteristics (such 
as modality, intensity, duration or complexity of intervention delivery). In particular, we did not 
exclude studies based on restrictions related to sample size, thereby ensuring that pilot-scale 
interventions, which often focus on newer, more innovative approaches, were captured by our 
evidence review. Furthermore, we complemented our broad focus on RBPs by also focusing on 
specific RBP intervention types (starting with those shown in the meta-TOC outlined in Figure 2 
and then expanding our focus based on the results of our search). 
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c. Comparator 
We considered quantitative studies that clearly identified a comparison/control group. The nature of 
a comparison/control group can depend closely on the specific methods deployed in the study (e.g. 
control group in a randomized controlled trial; preintervention outcomes for the unit on analysis in a 
before-and-after design; within-community non-adopters in a study using a community-level fixed-
effects design). We excluded any study without a clearly articulated control group (e.g. 
descriptive/predictive analyses highlighting drivers and determinants of selecting into RBP 
interventions) as well as quantitative methods for which the use of comparison/control groups was 
not relevant (e.g. life cycle assessments). 
d. Outcomes 
Consistent with our multisectoral intervention focus, we adopted a multi-actor focus and looked at a 
range of outcomes measured at the beneficiary, service provider, investor and system-wide levels. In 
addition, in line with our broad criteria related to study-level characteristics, we considered studies 
that measured outcomes at any point following the administration of the relevant RBP intervention. 
e. Study design 
We focused on studies that used both causal (experimental and quasi-experimental) and non-causal 
designs, with one important caveat: for CCTs, we relied only on systematic reviews. Experimental 
designs include studies that use randomization to delineate statistically indistinguishable treatment 
and control groups to evaluate causal impacts. Quasi-experimental designs aim to evaluate causal 
impacts in the absence of randomization and include (but are not limited to) difference-in-
differences, regression discontinuity, instrumental variable and propensity score matching designs. 
Non-causal designs (e.g. correlation analysis using cross-sectional data) do not aim to evaluate 
causal impacts but rather offer insights on simple quantitative relationships between key variables. 
f. Exclusion criteria 
We excluded all qualitative studies as well as studies that did not clearly articulate a 
comparison/control group. As mentioned above, we also excluded studies that did not focus on low-
income populations in Annex I countries or that did not report results for Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries. Finally, we excluded all published or grey literature that was not in English, as well as all 
studies published before the year 2000. 
4. SEARCH STRATEGY 
Consistent with the broad approach characterized in our inclusion/exclusion criteria, our search 
strategy was designed to systematically identify relevant publications on the effectiveness of RBP 
interventions in academic journals as well as in the grey literature. In this section, we describe our 
three-stage search strategy, outline the databases and repositories our search targeted, and describe 
the search terms that we used. 
a. Search steps 
We used a three-stage search strategy to search for studies germane to this evidence review. First, 
we searched the titles, abstracts and keywords of studies catalogued by academic databases for 
terms related to RBPs (excluding those related to CCTs), impact measurement and comparison 
groups.3 
 
3 A full list of the search terms we used for our main literature search (presented in syntax appropriate for the Scopus 
database) is shown in Appendix 2. 
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We then separately searched titles, abstracts and keywords of studies catalogued in these databases 
for a set of terms specific to CCTs and systematic reviews. Consistent with our inclusion/exclusion 
criteria, this enabled us to deploy distinct, targeted searches for: 
• Systematic reviews on the effects of CCTs; and 
• Both individual studies and systematic reviews related to all other types of RBPs. 
We complemented these systematic searches with manual searches of a set of databases focused 
exclusively on systematic reviews and evidence syntheses (Table 2). 
Finally, we adapted our search terms for the grey literature, for which we developed a custom search 
engine using the Programmable Search Engine tool developed by Google. Our custom search engine 
enabled us to search for and identify relevant publications (such as reports and unpublished working 
papers) hosted on preselected repositories. We complemented our custom search engine with Think 
Tank Search, a custom search engine developed by Harvard Library that enabled us to search for 
relevant publications hosted by over 1,200 global think tanks and research centres.4 
b. Databases and repositories 
Table 2 presents the full list of databases and repositories (covering published academic articles and 
systematic reviews, evidence syntheses and grey literature) that we used. 
Table 2. List of targeted databases 
DATABASE 
TYPE 






Scopus (https://www.scopus.com/) Cross-disciplinary 
repository 






• Collaboration for Environment Evidence Database of 
Evidence Reviews (CEEDER) 
• The Campbell Collaboration 
• Evidence for Policy and Practice Information and Co-
ordinating Centre (EPPI-Centre) systematic reviews 
• Evidence for Nature and People data portal 
 
Grey literature Custom search engine developed using Google Programmable 
Search Engine tool covering: 
• World Bank Policy Research Working Papers series 
• World Bank IEG Independent Evaluations and Annual 
Reviews 
• Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) Policy 
Publications and Evaluations 
• Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA) Publications 
• International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie) 
Publications 
• Center for Effective Global Action (CEGA) Research 
Publications 
• Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) Office of 
Evaluation and Oversight Publications 
 
 
4 A custom search engine developed using the Google Programmable Search Engine tool uses Google’s search algorithms 
to identify and deliver up to 100 of the most relevant search results from targeted databases and repositories. The use of 
two distinct custom search engines will yield up to 200 relevant grey literature publications. 
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DATABASE 
TYPE 
DATABASE NAME COMMENTS 
• AgResults Projects and Evaluation 
• USAID Development Experience Clearinghouse 
Harvard Library Think Tank Search 
(https://guides.library.harvard.edu/hks/think_tank_search) 
Covers 1,200+ global 
think tanks and 
research centres 
 
c. Search terms 
Our systematic search terms (presented in Appendix 2) were organized in the following categories: 
1) RBP terminology 
a) Basic terms: This subcategory includes terms that are often used interchangeably with 
or are closely related to the phrase “results-based payments”, including “payments by 
results”, “performance-based financing” and “pay-for-performance”. 
b) Intervention-specific terms: This subcategory includes terms that are often used 
interchangeably with or are closely related to the specific RBP interventions outlined in 
the evidence review’s meta-TOC (Figure 2). For example, to comprehensively search for 
studies that focus on “payments for environmental services”, we included “payments for 
environmental benefits”, “payments for ecosystem services” and “payments for 
ecosystem benefits”. 
2) Impact measurement terminology: This category includes terms related to the measurement 
and tracking of impacts, such as “effectiveness”, “affected”, “increased” and “improved.” 
3) Comparison group terminology: This category includes terms related to the articulation of 
comparison groups (such as “treatment” and “control”). It also includes terms related to 
specific empirical methods (such as “instrumental variable”) that do not always refer explicitly 
to comparison groups but that generate estimates of causal impacts that are comparative. 
4) General restrictions: This category contains a set of outlet-, study-, language- and time-
specific restrictions to enable us to restrict (academic database) search results to English-
language articles and systematic reviews published in peer-reviewed academic journals in or 
after the year 2000. When adapting terms from this category for our grey literature, we relaxed 
outlet-specific constraints. 
Consistent with our inclusion/exclusion criteria, we did not include any geography-related terms 
(because our evidence review seeks to capture studies that could potentially have a global focus). 
We also did not include any terms related to specific sectors and outcomes (given the evidence 
review’s multisectoral focus). To operationalize our search terms, we deployed Boolean operators to 
combine our various search terms and categories. Specifically, we combined search terms within 
each category using the OR operator, and each of the search categories using the AND operator. 
5. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
In this section, we describe our study screening procedure, which we applied to the studies found by 
our search procedures to identify publications germane to the goals of this evidence review. We then 
outline the process we used to extract relevant study- and intervention-level characteristics from 
each relevant study to generate our evidence review database. For both components, we also 
describe the steps we took to ensure consistency in screening, data extraction and coding quality 
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across multiple screeners and coders. Finally, we describe how this data set informed the 
development of evidence gap maps and the intervention heat map. 
a. Screening of studies 
To screen studies for relevance, we randomly assigned all studies identified by our search process to 
a team of study screeners, who used a checklist-based screening tool (following the study 
inclusion/exclusion criteria presented in Appendix 1) to carefully review the title, abstract and 
keywords for each identified study for relevance. Prior to beginning screening, each study screener 
participated in a basic training session on the objectives and scope of the evidence review and, in 
particular, on the review’s inclusion/exclusion criteria. As part of this training, we also assigned a 
randomly selected sample of 100 studies to all screeners for simultaneous screening and used 
follow-up discussions on inconsistently screened studies (e.g. a study that was marked as “relevant” 
by one screener but not by another) to refine the screening process. Once screening began, 10 per 
cent of studies were assigned to all screeners to continue to monitor screening consistency. 
Screening was used to exclude studies that were not germane to the evidence review. Studies that 
met the inclusion/exclusion criteria proceeded to the data extraction stage. 
b. Data extraction and management 
We randomly assigned studies that were germane to the evidence review to a team of study coders, 
who conducted a close review of each study and extracted key study-specific characteristics 
following a coding framework (see Appendix 3 for an overview of the coding framework). This 
framework enabled extraction of data related to the following: 
• Relevance status 
• Design-specific characteristics (including regional focus, sample size and empirical design) 
• RBP-specific characteristics (including the specific type of RBP intervention deployed, as well 
as identities of the actor administering the RBP intervention, the agent being incentivized by 
the intervention and the beneficiary being targeted); 
• Broad sectoral focus (e.g. health, education) 
• Study results (namely, the specific outputs or outcomes reported by the study along with 
information on the direction and, if appropriate, statistical significance of the reported 
quantitative estimate) 
If a study reported multiple effects associated with the RBP intervention in question (e.g. the impact 
of school vouchers on school attendance, test scores and household expenditures), the coding 
framework also allowed for each outcome to be coded separately. In addition, the coding framework 
contained a separate module specifically for systematic reviews related to CCTs (see Table A - 2), 
which enabled extraction of data on the scope, results and quality of the evidence synthesis 
presented in each systematic review, partly following the SURE checklist for systematic reviews 
adapted by Snilstveit and others (2016). In line with our inclusion/exclusion criteria (Appendix 1), 
we relied on only systematic reviews to characterize the evidence base on CCTs. For systematic 
reviews focusing on other RBP interventions, we instead identified the underlying studies included 
within each review, which were then coded individually as part of our data extraction process. 
Once again, to ensure consistency of coding quality, 10 per cent of studies selected for data 
extraction were assigned to both coders for independent coding before the start of the full data 
extraction process. Inconsistencies in the coding of this subset of studies were resolved through 
additional training and discussions to refine the data extraction process. 
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C. SEARCH RESULTS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
This section provides an overview of the number of studies identified, screened and included in the 
evidence review. It also highlights distributions of the records extracted from included studies by 
RBP intervention type, region and sector. 
1. SEARCH AND SCREENING 
The search found nearly 2,000 studies (1,817 academic articles and systematic reviews 
identified in academic databases; 8 systematic reviews identified in the designated systematic 
review/evidence review repositories; and 173 grey literature publications identified by our 
custom search engines). Figure 3 summarizes the distribution of studies found and included in the 
evidence review. Following the removal of duplicates and screening for relevance, 428 studies were 
selected for inclusion in the evidence review, consisting of 403 articles, briefs and reports, and 25 
systematic reviews on the effectiveness of CCTs. 
As noted above, to enable ex post validation of screening consistency, all study screeners reviewed 
approximately 10 per cent of the 1,626 studies retained for abstract and title during the abstract/title 
screening phase. Around 91 per cent of these studies were screened consistently by all screeners. 
Consistency checks during closer reviews of the text and coding yielded similar consistency rates. 
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Figure 3. PRISMA flow diagram summarizing search/screening results 
 
 
Scopus and EconLit 
(systematic search for published articles and 
systematic reviews) 
𝑁 = 1,817 
Systematic review repositories 
(manual search for systematic reviews/evidence 
syntheses) 
𝑁 = 8 
Grey literature 
(systematic search for evaluation reports, briefs and 
unpublished working papers) 
𝑁 = 173 
After duplicates removed 
𝑁 = 1,626  
Studies retained for abstract/title screening 
𝑁 = 1,626 
Did not meet inclusion/exclusion criteria 
𝑁 = 1,016 
Studies retained for close review 
𝑁 = 610 
Additional studies identified after review 
of underlying studies in non-CCT 
systematic reviews (𝑁 = 59) 
Non-CCT systematic reviews (separated for 
review of underlying studies) 
(𝑁 = 116) 
Published/grey literature articles and 
CCT systematic reviews (𝑁 = 369) 
Studies included in evidence review 
𝑁 = 428 (covering 1,718 distinct intervention/outcome records) 
Did not meet inclusion criteria (𝑁 = 119) 
𝑁 = 1,016 
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2. DISTRIBUTION BY RBP INTERVENTION TYPE 
The evidence base on the use of vouchers was the deepest, followed by those on pay-for-
performance (P4P) and PES interventions. Figure 4 highlights the distribution of RBP 
intervention types featured in the studies included in this evidence review.5 Voucher-based 
interventions constituted over one third of records extracted from included studies, and 30 and 25 
per cent of the sample focused on P4P and PES interventions, respectively. It is also worth noting 
that even though the evidence on the impacts of CCTs was drawn exclusively from systematic 
reviews – which limits how “frequently” these outcomes are recorded in our final data set as reviews 
typically report syntheses of outcomes from multiple studies – outcomes from studies that focus on 
CCTs constituted nearly 15 per cent of records. In contrast, few studies reported impacts of pull 
mechanisms or impact bonds on outcomes of interest, and we found no relevant studies that focused 
on the impacts of grand challenges or advance market commitments (AMCs) in our sample of 
published and grey literature. For this reason, in the remainder of this section, we present descriptive 
statistics disaggregated by the top five categories of RBP interventions only. 
Figure 4. Distribution of studies by RBP type 
 
Notes: P4P = Pay-for-performance; PES = Payment for environmental services; CCT = Conditional cash 
transfer. The “other” category includes studies on results-based transfers not covered by any other 
category, including conditional foreign aid (Öhler & Nunnenkamp, 2012), non-monetary incentives 
provided to health workers (Bernal & Martinez, 2020; Carmichael and others, 2019), and 
reemployment bonuses provided to recipients of unemployment benefits (Ahn, 2018). 
 
3. DISTRIBUTION BY REGION 
Over a quarter of the relevant literature on RBPs documented evidence from North America, 
followed closely by East Asia and Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America and the 
 
5 Because a study can focus on more than one RBP intervention, the sum of the percentages over all RBP intervention 
types need not equal 100. 
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Caribbean. Figure 5 presents the distribution of studies by region and includes single-country 
studies and multi-country studies restricted to a single region, as well as multi-region/global studies. 
The figure shows that, even though the evidence review’s inclusion/exclusion criteria restricted its 
scope to only include studies from Annex 1 countries if they focused on a low-income context or 
setting (relatively defined), over 25 per cent of coded outcomes were from studies that focused on a 
North American context (primarily the United States). Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and East Asia and Pacific each contributed 15 to 20 per cent of included studies, and 
multi-region/global studies (that is, those that focused on more than one country across different 
regions) contributed just over 5 per cent of the sample. Somewhat surprisingly, we found a 
relatively low share of studies that focused on South Asia in our sample. We similarly found low 
shares of studies that focused on Europe and Central Asia (at least partly due to our 
inclusion/exclusion criteria restricting the types of studies from Annex 1 countries that were deemed 
relevant for the review) or the Middle East and North Africa. 
Figure 5 also highlights within-region distributions of studies for selected RBP intervention types. 
We found that studies in our sample that assessed the effectiveness of voucher-based interventions 
overwhelmingly focused on voucher programmes in North America. This is unsurprising; housing, 
school and food voucher schemes that target low-income households and individuals in the United 
States, for example, have been extensively studied (e.g. Chetty and others, 2016; Wolf and others, 
2013). Similarly, we found that most of the studies that looked at the impacts of PES interventions 
focused on Latin America and the Caribbean, East Asia and the Pacific, and sub-Saharan Africa. 
This is consistent with the regional distribution of active PES programmes (Ezzine-de-Blas and 
others, 2016). In addition, we found that most of the studies that assessed P4P interventions did so in 
the sub-Saharan African context, including recent assessments of national and regional health-
focused P4P schemes in Rwanda and Tanzania (Basinga and others, 2011; Binyaruka and others, 
2018; Mayumana and others, 2017). Lastly, most of the studies that focused on CCTs adopted a 
multi-region/global approach. This was primarily due to our decision to focus exclusively on 
systematic reviews, which often synthesize multi-country evidence, to assess the evidence base on 
the impacts of CCTs (such as Durao and others, 2020). 
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Figure 5. Distribution of studies by region 
 
Notes: EAP = East Asia and Pacific; ECA = Europe and Central Asia; LAC = Latin America and the 
Caribbean; MNA = Middle East and North Africa; NAR = North America; SAR = South Asia; SSA 
= sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
4. DISTRIBUTION BY SECTOR 
Nearly half of the RBP literature was in the health sector, with the rest of the evidence base 
relatively evenly spread between agriculture and forestry, education and other sectors. Figure 
6 highlights the sectoral distribution of the studies included in the evidence review.6 Over 45 per 
cent of all studies focused wholly or in part on the health sector, 20 per cent of included studies 
related to agriculture and forestry, and another 15 to 20 per cent related to education. Despite 
increasing use of results-based approaches to target energy outcomes (e.g. Vivid Economics, 2013), 
almost no study focused on an application of RBPs in the energy sector. 
Within-sector distributions by type of RBP revealed expected patterns. Studies that assessed the 
effectiveness of PES schemes, for instance, overwhelmingly focused on agriculture and forestry, 
while P4P- and CCT-focused studies were skewed towards the health sector. Similarly, 30 to 40 per 
cent of studies that looked at voucher interventions focused on health, education or “other” sectors 
(such as housing). 
 
6 We coded studies as having a primary and, if relevant, a secondary sectoral focus. For this reason, a study may be 
counted in more than one sector. 
- Evidence review on results-based payments: Evidence gap map and intervention heat map - 
©IEU  |  23 
Figure 6. Distribution of studies by sector 
 
Notes: “Other sectors” covers studies not covered by any other sectoral categories, including housing (e.g. 
Shroder, 2002), labour/employment (e.g. Ahn, 2018), multisectoral studies (e.g. Sherr and others, 
2009) and water (e.g. He and others, 2015). 
D. EVIDENCE GAP MAP 
A majority of the relevant scholarship on RBPs focused on the use of vouchers to incentivize 
improvements in beneficiaries’ sector-specific and socioeconomic outcomes, followed by P4P 
and CCT interventions and PES mechanisms. P4P and CCT interventions also targeted 
consumption and supply of goods and services, and PES mechanisms targeted system-wide 
outcomes, primarily in the environmental domain. Table 3 presents the overall evidence gap map 
(EGM), which maps the evidence on RBP impacts of outcomes extracted from all included studies 
to our intervention/outcome framework.7 In addition, Table A - 3 through 4.6 present results from 
applying various cross-sectoral and cross-regional filters to the main EGM to highlight other 
patterns in the evidence. Specifically, Table A - 3 shows results for Annex I and non-Annex I 
countries; Table A - 4 shows results by region; Table A - 5 focuses exclusively on evidence from 
least developed countries (LDCs), as designated by the United Nations; Table A - 6 presents sector-
disaggregated distributions for the top three sectors shown in Figure 6; Table A - 7 highlights results 
by different agent types (i.e. the type of actor directly incentivized by a particular RBP 
intervention); and Table A - 8 presents a similar filtering by RBP beneficiary type (i.e. the type of 
actor a particular RBP intervention seeks to ultimately benefit).8 
 
7 Recall that we only used systematic reviews and not individual studies to review the evidence on CCTs. For this reason, 
all EGMs indicate CCTs separately for comparability. 
8 Although we had initially intended to create a filtered EGM to present evidence from small island developing States 
(SIDS), we only found one paper focusing on an RBP intervention in a SIDS context – namely, a randomized controlled 
trial by Chin-Quee and others (2010), who tested the effectiveness of vouchers to incentivize the uptake of oral 
contraceptive pills in Jamaica. For this reason, we do not present a separate EGM for SIDS. We do not feature a separate 
EGM for the energy sector for a similar reason. 
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Table 3. Evidence gap map: Overall 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond            2        
Payment for Environmental Services  16  22 101 71   3    7  9 4 1 54 5 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance 1 34 14 44 241 6 19 72 145 16 11  4  8 1  8 4 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 4  2 2 5 2         1 2  3 2 
Voucher 6 6 42 74 328 70  1 22 1   3 1 2   5 1 
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    37 86 10  11 13    1  7   5 2 
Other  3  4 9 2   13    3  1   3  
Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. SR = systematic review (underlying studies not reviewed). Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Column titles indicated 
below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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E. INTERVENTION HEAT MAP 
In this section, we examine the distribution of funds allocated by the Green Climate Fund (GCF) 
using results-based modalities. We first provide an overview of the GCF projects approved to 
disburse funds using results-based approaches. We then visually present our results using an 
intervention heat map (IHM) based on our intervention/outcome framework. 
1. OVERVIEW OF INTERVENTIONS 
Between 2015 and 2020, the GCF committed USD 7.2 billion across 159 projects, of which at 
least USD 529 million was approved to be disbursed using results-based modalities deployed 
as part of 15 projects. Our data on the GCF’s funding commitments came from a detailed review 
of the funding documentation for 15 GCF projects approved to disburse funds – either wholly or in 
part – using results-based modalities.9 Table 4 provides an overview of these projects. Together, 
these projects represented a financial commitment of nearly USD 693 million from the GCF 
between 2016 and 2020.10 Around 76 per cent of this amount (USD 529 million) was allocated for 
results-based modalities. The difference between the total budgeted amount and the amount 
disbursed using results-based approaches is due to differences in the financing instruments used for 
the projects. Nearly all identified projects used either the “grants” or the “results-based payment” 
financing instruments.11 In the context of GCF projects, the latter instrument is used by projects that 
have been approved under the GCF’s REDD+ RBP pilot programme to provide monetary transfers 
to countries for verified emissions reductions stemming from reduced deforestation and forest 
degradation. For this reason, we treated nearly all the budget for these projects (except for a 2.5 per 
cent charge indicated for use of proceeds and non-carbon benefits) as disbursed under results-based 
modalities (namely, PES mechanisms). In contrast, a results-based approach is typically one of 
many activities deployed as part of projects that use the “grants” financing mechanism, which is 
reflected in underlying budget allocations (see Appendix 5 for additional details related to 
identifying the budget share associated with these results-based sub-components). 
The GCF relied principally on PES mechanisms to deploy its results-based commitments, 
followed by a mix of CCT- and voucher-based approaches. As shown in Table 4, our review of 
project-level funding documentation shed light on the specific types of RBP interventions used in 
each project. We found that 10 of the 15 results-based projects funded by the GCF used PES 
mechanisms to deliver targeted incentives, 3 relied on CCTs, and 1 project combined CCT- and 
voucher-based approaches (by delivering redeemable vouchers to targeted beneficiaries, conditional 
on completion of key project-level milestones). 
GCF projects that used PES mechanisms primarily targeted global emissions reductions, 
while those that used CCT- and voucher-based approaches also targeted a wider range of 
sector-specific and socioeconomic outcomes. We used project funding documentation to identify 
the specific outcomes targeted by the results-based components of each project. As funds for 
projects approved using the GCF’s “results-based payments” financing instrument were provided in 
exchange for verified emissions reductions, we assumed this is the primary targeted outcome for 
each of these projects. Identifying specific outcomes for “grants” projects was somewhat more 
complex. Consider, for instance, project FP125, which aimed to enhance the resilience of 
 
9 We did not review the project documentation of all GCF projects to identify these projects. Eight projects are part of the 
GCF’s REDD+ RBP pilot programme, while the remaining were extracted from an internal GCF dataset tracking the use 
of CCTs across recent projects. For this reason, we do not believe that these projects represent the totality of the GCF’s 
results-based commitments.  
10 We excluded any amount co-financed by national governments or other organizations. 
11 The only exception is project FP146, which used a mix of “senior loans” and “grants”. 
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smallholder farmers through increased use of climate-resilient agricultural practices. Only a subset 
of project beneficiaries (specifically, poor and near-poor individuals) were eligible for the hybrid 
CCT–voucher mechanisms deployed as part of this project, which suggests that in addition to 
beneficiaries’ sector-specific resilience outcomes, results-based approaches also intended to improve 
socioeconomic outcomes. When necessary, we made assumptions related to the distribution and 
allocation of project funds over one or more outcomes, drawing on project- and activity-level 
objectives stated in the funding documentation (as described in Appendix 5). 

















FP019 Ecuador Grants PES  41.2  17.0 
FP062 Paraguay Grants CCT  25.1  2.4 
FP067 Tajikistan Grants CCT  9.3  1.6 
FP100 Brazil Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  96.5  94.1 
FP110 Ecuador Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  18.6  18.1 
FP117 Lao PDR Grants PES  17.8  4.1 
FP120 Chile Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  63.6  62.1 
FP121 Paraguay Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  50.0  48.8 
FP125 Viet Nam Grants CCT/Voucher  30.2  3.5 
FP130 Indonesia Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  103.8  101.3 
FP134 Colombia Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  28.2  27.5 
FP142 Argentina Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  82.0  80.0 
FP144 Costa Rica Results-Based 
Payment 
PES  54.1  52.8 
FP146 Nicaragua Senior 
Loans/Grants 
PES 64.1 12.1 
SAP002 Kyrgyzstan Grants CCT  8.6  3.1 
 
2. DISTRIBUTION OF GCF FUNDING 
Table 5 maps the GCF’s RBP-allocated commitments to our intervention/outcome framework in the 
form of an IHM. 
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Table 5. Intervention heat map of GCF’s results-based financing (nominal USD, millions) 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services     2.0 7.7          5.7  502.4  
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance                    
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher     1.8               
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer     6.4 1.6            0.8  
Other                    
Notes: Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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F. DISCUSSION 
In this section, we bring together the findings from the EGM and IHM to reflect on the patterns the 
EGM revealed on the use of RBPs, and its implication for achieving climate goals. We also offer 
some specific insights to inform the GCF’s interventions. 
1. PATTERNS IN USE OF RBPS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR CLIMATE 
The evidence base suggests that RBPs have been extensively used to incentivize individuals 
and households, as well as service providers, across multisectoral contexts. The evidence base 
on voucher-, P4P-, PES- and CCT-based approaches was relatively deep, whereas that grand 
challenges, impact bonds, AMCs and pull mechanisms was thinner. Although the effects of 
vouchers have been studied in multisectoral contexts (including health and education as well as 
housing and labour/employment), the evidence base on P4P and CCT mechanisms was drawn 
primarily from health-related applications; assessments of the effectiveness of PES interventions, in 
contrast, expectedly focused almost entirely on the agriculture and forestry sector (Figure 6). 
Despite these different sectoral applications, each of these interventions have been used primarily to 
incentivize individuals and households or service providers (Table A - 7). In addition, the effects of 
P4P-based approaches on service-provider-level outcomes (including the quantity as well as quality 
of supplied goods and services) had also been studied extensively (Table 3).12 It is important to note 
that even that though there is thinner evidence on the efficacy of grand challenges, they are used 
extensively to incentivize technology development.13 This points to a need to evaluate their efficacy, 
which we suspect is weakened by the delivery of a technology at the end of the grand challenge 
even if there is evidence that without the challenge it would not have been delivered. Conrad and 
others (2017) detail an approach to evaluate grand challenges that would inform these evaluations. 
RBPs have most frequently targeted sector-specific outcomes. While the relative use of RBP 
interventions differed across sectors, within sectors there was a concentration of evidence around the 
extent to which RBP interventions drove sectoral outcomes (Table A - 6). This suggests that despite 
significant differences in underlying incentive structures, targeted agents and modalities through 
which incentive payments are delivered, RBP interventions can be deployed to achieve progress on 
outcomes in multisectoral settings. 
RBPs may be uniquely suited to address both demand- and supply-side constraints and 
promote uptake of technologies and practices that deliver climate benefits. Multisectoral 
innovations that lower emissions (such as climate-smart agriculture and cleaner household-level 
energy technologies) deliver global public goods. These benefits are typically not internalized by 
end users, leading to low adoption (Foster & Rosenzweig, 2010). Even when technologies enhance 
end users’ resilience to climate change and deliver private benefits (e.g. cool roofing solutions that 
lower ambient temperatures in informal housing), they often remain prohibitively expensive for the 
poor (Mendelsohn, 2012). Supply-side barriers (such as weak supply chains) exacerbate these 
challenges. RBPs targeted at individuals and households may help align incentives, enhance 
affordability and increase demand for climate-smart solutions, while those targeted at service 
providers may incentivize necessary investments in supply chains, management and marketing to 
help meet this demand. 
 
12 This may be partly because P4P contracts often aim to incentivize organizational agents (such as health care facilities or 
clinics), whereas PES approaches typically target individual landowners and farmers. This may make the former more 
likely to induce organization-level changes. 
13 Since 2011, for instance, just USAID and its partners have funded and launched 10 grand challenges in a variety of 
sectors, including maternal health, education, and agriculture (USAID, 2020).  
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2. GOING FORWARD: INSIGHTS FROM THE EVIDENCE BASE FOR THE GCF 
A comparison of the EGM on the effectiveness of RBPs (Table 3) with the IHM on the distribution 
of the GCF’s RBP-based commitments (Table 5) yields five key insights to guide future GCF 
projects. 
First, there is potential for growth in the use of RBP-based approaches within the GCF’s 
overall funding portfolio. GCF funding for RBPs deployed as part of the projects we analysed was 
only 7 per cent of its total commitments between 2015 and 2020. Of the 15 projects analysed for this 
evidence review (covering nearly all of the results-based funding across the 15 projects), 8 
committed funding as part of the GCF’s REDD+ pilot programme, which rewards countries for 
verified emissions reductions stemming from reduced deforestation and forest degradation. While 
funding allocated via the REDD+ pilot programme is likely to grow as an increasing number of 
REDD+ projects mature from Phase 2 (implementation) into the largely untested Phase 3 (RBPs 
following verification), there are opportunities to allocate funds using other RBP modalities. For 
instance, the EGM revealed that the evidence base on the use of vouchers to induce uptake of social 
services (principally in the health sector) was deep. The bulk of this evidence was drawn from the 
North American context, in which systems to establish and honour voucher-based payments are 
relatively well developed compared to low- and middle-income countries. Nevertheless, GCF-
supported projects have experimented with the use of vouchers to induce uptake of climate-smart 
agricultural technologies. Further GCF efforts to use vouchers to support widespread adoption and 
sustained use of technologies that deliver climate benefits in this way should initiate by 
understanding the relevant constraints and opportunities that exist in developing contexts. 
Second, there is potential to expand the GCF’s existing RBP-based commitments to target 
climate “co-benefits”. For instance, the EGM revealed that assessments of the efficacy of PES 
mechanisms had focused on impacts on cross-sectoral and non-environmental socioeconomic 
outcomes (such as agricultural yields and household income/expenditure) almost three times as 
frequently as they had on only impacts on deforestation rates or emissions reductions. In contrast, 
the GCF had deployed PES mechanisms overwhelmingly to target verified emissions reductions as 
part of its REDD+ pilot programme, without an explicit focus on other resulting benefits. Targeting 
of co-benefits could help increase potential beneficiaries’ capacity to adapt to climate change. It may 
also help enhance the long-term sustainability of the climate solutions that GCF-supported projects 
seek to promote. 
Third, there is potential for the GCF to grow its support for projects that directly incentivize 
service providers. The EGMs that disaggregate the evidence based on the agent targeted by 
different types of interventions show that P4P-based approaches have been extensively used to 
enhance the quality of goods and services – and, to a lesser degree, the overall supply of goods and 
services – delivered by providers. P4P approaches had also been used to target outcomes at the level 
of service providers. In contrast, a focus on service providers was noticeably absent from the GCF’s 
portfolio of RBP-based commitments that we analysed. Although P4P interventions have been 
deployed primarily in the health sector (Figure 6), complementarities exist in the ways these 
payment modalities could be adapted for sectors more directly related to climate-related mitigation 
or adaptation activities. Providers of agricultural extension services or of adaptive livelihood 
strategies that may not be adapted by households focused on short-term outcomes, for instance, 
could be incentivized through P4P interventions in ways that have been used for health care 
facilities. Insofar as such incentives promote the uptake of climate-smart technologies and climate-
resilient practices, they can help advance progress in line with the GCF’s overall goals and 
objectives in both mitigation and adaptation. 
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Fourth, GCF’s results-based commitments must carefully account for the potential for 
unintended consequences. Results-based incentives can induce complex behavioural responses by 
targeted agents. In the climate domain, the implications of such behavioural responses can be 
significant. Incentives provided to end-users to switch to energy-efficient technologies, for instance, 
can lead to over-use, potentially reversing emissions gains (e.g. Usmani and others, 2017). In non-
Annex 1 countries, where the local capacity to rigorously verify whether pre-specified outcomes 
were appropriately achieved may be relatively weak, such unintended effects may never come to 
light. This may partly explain why relatively few studies in this evidence review reported 
unintended impacts (Table 3). Yet, if not accounted for during the design phase, unintended effects 
may end up partially offsetting the environmental benefits achieved by enhanced deployment of 
results-based modalities to catalyse climate action. 
Finally, as GCF considers various RBPs modalities, it should conduct careful prospective 
analysis to assess the implications of using different incentive structures. It may not be 
appropriate for mitigation-related outcomes to pin results on GHG reduction directly if service 
providers or end-users cannot accurately determine the influence of their activities on emissions. 
Instead, it may be useful to focus on intermediate outputs and processes proven to reduce GHG 
emissions and those in manageable control of service providers and end-users (e.g. adoption of LED 
lights, energy-efficient appliances). Incentive structures achieve sustainable impacts if they focus on 
addressing the core constraints limiting the development or adoption of activities that deliver 
climate benefits. Incentive structures that can create demand for emissions-reducing goods and 
services (or demand for attributes correlated with lower GHG emissions) are preferable to those that 
reward adoption of actions that would not be sustained once the RBP mechanism is removed. 
Further, incentive structures differ in the degree of competition they induce among participants, the 
number of participants they attract, and the type of market that the particular RBP modality leaves 
behind. 
G. CONCLUSION 
RBPs can help drive progress towards meeting ambitious global climate targets. This evidence 
review takes stock of the disparate evidence base on the effectiveness of results-based approaches 
across multiple sectors to synthesize insights for their enhanced application in the climate domain. 
We identified 428 studies on the effectiveness of RBP interventions through systematic searches and 
screening of the academic and grey literature. Based on sector-, intervention- and implementation-
related characteristics extracted from these studies, we developed an EGM that highlighted the 
distribution of the relevant evidence on the impacts of various RBP interventions on beneficiary-, 
service-provider- and investor/system-level outcomes. The EGM revealed that vouchers, pay-for-
performance models, PES and CCTs have been extensively studied, whereas the evidence base on 
the use of grand challenges, impact bonds, AMCs and pull mechanisms is thinner. It also 
highlighted regional patterns in the use of these interventions and the outcomes they target. Most of 
the evidence was drawn from assessments in North America, East Asia and Pacific, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and Latin America and the Caribbean; evidence from South Asia and especially from the 
Middle East and North Africa was relatively limited. Similar patterns existed in the sectoral 
distribution of included studies, with nearly half of the evidence drawn from applications in the 
health sector, followed by agriculture and forestry, and education; evidence on RBPs in the energy 
sector was scant. 
Using the same intervention/outcome framework that guided the structure of the EGM, we 
developed an IHM that highlighted the distribution of the GCF’s financial commitments to results-
based approaches in 15 recent projects. A comparison of the broader evidence base on RBPs to 
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these funding patterns suggests that there is considerable potential for growth in the use of results-
based approaches in the GCF’s funding portfolio. 
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Appendix 1. INCLUSION/EXCLUSION CRITERIA ORGANIZED USING 
THE PICOS (POPULATION, INTERVENTION, COMPARATOR, 
OUTCOME AND STUDY DESIGN) MODEL 
INCLUDED 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF WHAT 
WILL BE CAPTURED 
EXCLUDED 
1. Population   
Studies that focus on results-based 
payment (RBP) interventions in: 
• Non-Annex I countries 
• Low-income contexts/settings 
(defined in relative terms) in 
Annex I countries 
• Non-Annex I and Annex I 
countries (jointly) if analyses 
distinguish effects across the 
two samples 
• Evaluation of an education 
voucher programme in 
Bangladesh 
• Evaluation of a housing voucher 
programme targeting low-income 
families in the United States 
• Global evaluation of payments 
for ecosystem services (PES) that 
separately reports results by 
World Bank income 
classification 
Combination of both non-
Annex I and Annex I 
countries if analyses do not 
distinguish the two 
samples (unless the 
intervention is in a low-
income context/setting in 
an Annex I country) 
2. Intervention   
Multisectoral focus looking at RBP 
interventions in, among other 
things, infrastructure, social 
protection, health, education, 
justice, aid, mitigation, poverty, 
adaptation and conservation 
• Evaluation of PES in agricultural 
and forestry sector 
• Evaluation of use of voucher-
based incentives in education 
sector 
 
RBP interventions delivered at any 
administrative level (national and 
subnational) 
• Evaluation of a global grand 
challenge to incentivize 
innovation 
• Evaluation of development 
impact bond to incentivize 
improvements in educational 
outcomes in four Indian states 
 
RBP interventions delivered to any 
beneficiary type 
• Evaluation of farmer-level 
delivery of PES 
• Evaluation of household-level 
education voucher programme 
 
RBP interventions implemented by 
any actor 
• Evaluation of advance market 
commitment contract developed 
and administered by the World 
Bank 
• Evaluation of food voucher 
programme administered by 
government agency 
 
Studies looking at RBP intervention 
with different: 
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INCLUDED 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF WHAT 
WILL BE CAPTURED 
EXCLUDED 
• Co-interventions 
• Degrees of complexity 
• Sample sizes (including pilot-
scale tests of recent 
innovations) 
3. Comparator   
Studies that identify a 
comparison/control group 
• Experimental evaluation of 
education voucher programme 
with “control” and “treatment” 
households 
• Before-and-after design 
comparing postintervention 
outcomes among a sample of 
farmers that received PES with 
preintervention outcomes 
• Descriptive/predictive 




• Methods that do not 
use 
comparison/control 
groups (e.g. life cycle 
assessment) 
4. Outcome   
Outcomes measured at any point 
following the RBP intervention 
• Evaluations of RBP intervention 
reporting outcomes from follow-
ups at the three-month, one-year 
or five-year marks 
 
Multi-actor focus with outcomes 
reported at the beneficiary, service-
provider, investor and/or system-
wide levels 
• Reported beneficiary-level 
outcomes (e.g. children’s 
learning outcomes) 
• Reported service-provider-level 
outcomes (e.g. revenues) 
• Reported investor-level and 
system-wide outcomes (e.g. aid 
effectiveness) 
 
5. Study design   
Quantitative studies (experimental, 
quasi-experimental and non-causal 
designs) 
• Randomized controlled trials 
• Difference-in-differences design 
• Before-and-after design 
• Correlational analyses 
 
For conditional cash transfers 
(CCTs): Only systematic reviews 
will be included 
• Systematic review of the 
experimental literature 
evaluating impacts of CCTs on 
vaccination rates in low- and 
middle-income countries 
 
Peer-reviewed published literature • Articles and reviews published in 
peer-reviewed academic journals 
(e.g. Environmental and 
Resource Economics, Health 
Policy) 
 
Grey literature • Reports, preprints, and 
unpublished working papers 
from selected repositories and 
 
- Evidence review on results-based payments: Evidence gap map and intervention heat map - 
40  |  ©IEU 
INCLUDED 
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF WHAT 
WILL BE CAPTURED 
EXCLUDED 
think tanks (e.g. AgResults 
projects/evaluations database) 
English-language literature   
Published in or after the year 2000   
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Appendix 2. SCOPUS SEARCH TERMS 
 CATEGORY  
1 RBP terminology  
(a) Basic terms "payment* by result*" OR "result*-based payment*" OR "result*-based 
financ*" OR "result*-based fund*" OR "result*-based aid" OR "pay*-
for-result*" OR "pay*-for-performance" OR "pay*-for-success" OR 
"performance-based fund*" OR "performance-based financ*" OR 
"performance-based aid" OR "performance-based pay*" OR 
"performance-related pay*" OR "performance-based incentiv*" OR 
"cash on delivery" OR "performance-based incentive*" OR "output-
based aid" OR "outcome-based financ*" OR "incentiv* pay*" OR "merit 
pay" OR "performance-oriented transfer*" OR "performance-based 
contracting" OR "performance-driven loan*" OR "policy-based loan*" 




 Grand Challenges "grand challenge*” OR “proportional prize” OR “winner-take-all" OR 
"inducement prize*" 
 Impact Bonds "impact bond*” OR “social benefit bond*” OR “green bond*" OR 
"development bond*" 
 Payments for 
Environmental Services 
"payment* for ecosystem* service*" OR "payment* for environment* 
service*" OR "payment* for ecosystem* benefit*" OR "payment* for 
environment* benefit*" OR "carbon credit*" OR "carbon offset*" 
 Advance Market 
Commitments 
"advance* market commitment*" 
 Pull Mechanisms "pull mechanism*" OR "pull fund*" OR "pull financ*" 
 Vouchers ( voucher* W/2 ( health* OR medic* OR school* OR educat* OR food* 
OR housing ) ) 
2 Impact measurement 
terminology 
impact* OR evaluat* OR effect* OR efficac* OR benefit* OR improv* 
OR progress OR growth OR increas* OR decreas* OR reduc* OR gain 
OR declin* OR success* OR statistic* OR affect* OR higher OR lower 
OR reach OR adopt* OR penetrat* OR outcome* 
3 Comparison group 
terminology 
"quasi experiment*" OR "quasi-experiment*" OR quasiexperiment* OR 
"random* control* trial*" OR "random* trial*" OR "RCT*" OR 
randomi* OR ( matching W/2 ( study OR procedure OR "using" OR 
use* OR observable* ) ) OR "propensity score" OR psm OR "regression 
discontinuity" OR "regression kink" OR "fuzzy regression" OR "sharp 
regression" OR "discontinuous design" OR "rdd" OR "difference* in 
difference*" OR "difference*-in-difference*" OR "diff in diff" OR "diff-
in-diff" OR ( random* W/1 ( allocat* OR assign* OR select* ) ) OR 
"research synthesis" OR "fixed effect*" OR "synthetic control" OR 
"rapid evidence assessment*" OR "systematic literature review*" OR 
"systematic* review*" OR metaanaly* OR "meta analy*" OR "meta-
analy*" OR "control* evaluation" OR "control* treatment" OR 
"instrumental variable*" OR "as an instrument" OR ( heckit W/2 ( 
model* OR estimat* OR procedure OR method ) ) OR ( heckman* W/5 
( sample OR selection OR model OR correction ) ) OR ( ( treatment OR 
intervention OR comparison OR control OR subsidy ) W/0 group ) OR ( 
( counterfactual OR "counter factual" OR "counter-factual" OR random* 
) W/2 ( study OR studies OR analysis OR experiment* ) ) OR ( ( 
counterfactual OR "counter factual" OR "counter-factual" OR random* ) 
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 CATEGORY  
W/2 ( outcome* ) ) OR causal* OR "control group*" OR "comparison 
group*" OR ( ( control OR treatment ) W/0 ( communit* OR village* 
OR school* OR farm* OR household* OR student* OR mother* OR 
patient* ) ) OR ( experiment* W/1 ( study OR studies OR analysis OR 
design* ) ) OR ( ( treatment OR intervention ) W/2 effect* ) OR 
"intention-to-treat" OR "intention to treat" OR "econometric analysis" 
OR ( impact* W/1 ( evaluation OR study OR studies ) ) OR ( "controlled 
before" W/2 after ) OR "quasi experimental time series" OR "interrupted 
time series" OR "cross-sectional data" 
4 General restrictions  
 Published in or after the 
year 2000 
( PUBYEAR > 1999 ) 
 Source type: Academic 
journal 
( LIMIT-TO ( SRCTYPE , "j" ) ) 
 Document type: Research 
article or review 
( LIMIT-TO ( DOCTYPE , "ar" ) OR LIMIT-TO (DOCTYPE, "re" ) ) 
 Language: English ( LIMIT-TO ( LANGUAGE , "English" ) ) 
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Appendix 3. DATA EXTRACTION FRAMEWORK 
Table A - 1 outlines data that were extracted from the academic articles and grey literature 
publications identified by the search. Table A - 2 outlines the same for systematic reviews related to 
CCTs and includes modules to evaluate the quality of each review following the checklist adapted 
by Snilstveit and others (2016). 
Table A - 1. Data extraction framework for academic articles and grey literature publications 
TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
A. General information   
Coder ID   
Publication ID   
Publication type  Academic 
 Grey literature 
 
Publication title   
Publication author(s)   
Publication year   
DOI  For academic publications 
Journal name  For academic publications 
If article not relevant  Not relevant  For tagging articles found to 
not meet inclusion/exclusion 
criteria during the data 
extraction process. No further 
coding conducted. 
If article not accessible  Not accessible For articles found to not be 
accessible after library review. 
No further coding conducted. 
If article a systematic review 
of CCTs 
 CCT systematic review Article coded using framework 
shown in Table A - 2 instead.  
If article a systematic review 
of non-CCT RBP 
interventions 
 Non-CCT systematic review Articles included in the 
systematic review screened 
using inclusion/exclusion 
criteria and, if found to be 
relevant and not identified by 
original literature search, 
added to list of articles 
requiring data extraction. No 
further coding conducted of 
systematic review.  
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
 Other, specify: ____ 
Country 
(if single-country focus) 
  
Country grouping  Small island developing State (SID) 
 Least developed country (LDC) 
 N/A 
 
Coder notes   
B. Intervention   
RBP type  Grand challenges 
 Impact bonds 
 Payments for environmental services 
 Advance market commitments 
 Pull mechanisms 
 Vouchers 
 Conditional cash transfers 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 
Beneficiary type  Individuals/households 
 Organization/establishments/firms 
 Communities 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure or N/A 
The actor that the RBP 
intervention ultimately aims to 
benefit 
Agent type  Individuals/households 
 Organization/establishments/firms 
 Communities 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure or N/A 
The actor that the RBP 
intervention incentivizes 
Principal type  NGO 
 Local/national government 
 Foreign government 
 Multilateral organization 
 Researcher/academic 
 Private investor 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure or N/A 
The actor that manages the 
RBP intervention and/or 
delivers the RBP incentive 
C. Study design   
Empirical/quantitative method  RCT 




 (Controlled) before-and-after 
 Heckman correction 
 Interrupted time series 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
 Cross-sectional regression analysis 
 Other, specify: ____ 
Sample size   




 Higher administrative divisions 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 
Study start year   
Study end year   
D. Outcomes   
Study primary sectoral focus  Health 
 Education 
 Agriculture and forestry 
 Energy 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 




 Agriculture and forestry 
 Energy 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 N/A 
If applicable 
Outcome 1: Level  Beneficiary 
 Service provider 
 Investor/system-wide 
 Unintended consequence 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure 
 
Outcome 1: Theme Select relevant outcome theme from 
I/O framework. 
 
Outcome 1: Indicator Specify: ____  
Outcome 1: Result  Positive/statistically significant 
 Positive/not statistically significant 
 Negative/not statistically significant 
 Negative/statistically significant 
 Unsure or N/A 
 
Outcome 1: Moderators  Unit-specific characteristic (Sex, 
wealth, education, firm size, etc.) 
 Context-specific characteristics 
(rural/urban, weather/landscape, 
institutional factors, etc.) 
 Unsure 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
 N/A 
⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
Outcome 20: Level  Beneficiary 
 Service provider 
 Investor/system-wide 
 Unintended consequence 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure 
 
Outcome 20: Theme Select relevant outcome theme from 
I/O framework. 
 
Outcome 20: Indicator Specify: ____  
Outcome 20: Result  Positive/statistically significant 
 Positive/not statistically significant 
 Negative/not statistically significant 
 Negative/statistically significant 
 Unsure or N/A 
 
Outcome 20: Moderators  Unit-specific characteristic (Sex, 
wealth, education, firm size, etc.) 
 Context-specific characteristics 
(rural/urban, weather/landscape, 





Table A - 2. Draft data extraction framework for systematic reviews related to CCTs 




Coder ID   
Publication ID   
Publication type  Academic article 
 Grey literature 
 
Publication title   
Publication author(s)   
Publication year   
DOI  For academic articles: 
Journal name  For academic articles: 
If article not relevant  Not relevant  For tagging articles found to not meet 
inclusion/exclusion criteria during the 
data extraction process. No further coding 
conducted. 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 














Country grouping  Small island developing State 
(SID) 
 Least developed country (LDC) 
 N/A 
 
Coder notes   
B. Intervention   
Beneficiary type  Individuals/households 
 Organization/establishments/firms 
 Communities 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure or N/A 
The actor that the RBP intervention 
ultimately aims to benefit 
Agent type  Individuals/households 
 Organization/establishments/firms 
 Communities 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure or N/A 
The actor that the RBP intervention 
incentivizes 
Principal type  NGO 
 Local/national government 
 Foreign government 
 Multilateral organization 
 Researcher/academic 
 Private investor 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Unsure or N/A 
The actor that manages the RBP 
intervention/delivers the RBP incentive 
C. Study design   
Number of included 
studies 
  
Methodological focus  Experimental only 
 Experimental and/or quasi-
experimental only 
 Any empirical and/or quantitative 
study 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
 Other, specify: ____ 




 Higher administrative divisions 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 
Start year of period 
covered by search 
  
End year of period 
covered by search 
  
D. Outcomes   
Sector  Health 
 Education 
 Agriculture and forestry 
 Energy 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 
Outcome 1: Level  Beneficiary 
 Service provider 
 Investor/system-wide 
 Unintended consequence 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 
Outcome 1: Theme Select relevant outcome theme from 
I/O framework. 
 
Outcome 1: Indicator Specify: ____  
Outcome 1: Result  Positive/high confidence 
 Positive/low confidence 
 Negative/low confidence 
 Negative/high confidence 




 Unit-specific characteristic (Sex, 
wealth, education, firm size, etc.) 
 Context-specific characteristics 
(rural/urban, weather/landscape, 




⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
Outcome 20: Level  Beneficiary 
 Service provider 
 Investor/system-wide 
 Unintended consequence 
 Other, specify: ____ 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
Outcome 20: Theme Select relevant outcome theme from 
I/O framework. 
 
Outcome 20: Indicator Specify: ____  
Outcome 20: Result  Positive/high confidence 
 Positive/low confidence 
 Negative/low confidence 
 Negative/high confidence 




 Unit-specific characteristic (Sex, 
wealth, education, firm size, etc.) 
 Context-specific characteristics 
(rural/urban, weather/landscape, 




E. Methods used to 




Are the criteria used 
for deciding which 
studies to include in 





Did the authors specify: 






PARTIALLY: Any other 






 Can’t tell 
Were the following done: 
 Language bias avoided (no restriction 
of inclusion based on language) 
 No restriction of inclusion based on 
publication status 
 Relevant databases searched (Minimum 
criteria: All reviews should search at least 
one source of grey literature such as 
Google; for health: Medline/PubMed + 
Cochrane Library; for social sciences 
IDEAS + at least one database of general 
social science literature and one subject-
specific database) 
 Reference lists in included articles 
checked 
 Authors/experts contacted 
YES: All 
PARTIALLY: Relevant databases and 
reference lists are both reported 
NO: Any other 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
Was bias in the 





Did the authors specify: 
 Independent screening of full text by at 
least 2 reviewers 
 List of included studies provided 
 List or number of excluded studies 
provided 
YES: All 
PARTIALLY: Independent screening and 
list of included studies provided are both 
reported 
NO: All other 
Did the authors use 
appropriate criteria to 
assess the quality and 
risk of bias in 
analysing the studies 




Did the authors specify: 
 The criteria used for assessing the 
quality / risk of bias were reported 
 A table or summary of the assessment 
of each included study for each criterion 
was reported 
 “Sensible” criteria (such as a 
recognized tool or checklist) were used 
that focus on the quality/risk of bias 
(including selection bias, contamination, 
attrition bias, detection bias and reporting 
bias) 
F. Methods used to 












 Independent data extraction by at least 
2 reviewers 
 A table or summary of the 
characteristics of the participants, 
interventions and outcomes for the 
included studies 
 A table or summary of the results of all 
the included studies 
YES: All 
PARTIALLY: First and third only 
NO: All other 
N/A: If no studies/no data 
Are the methods used 
by the review authors 
to analyse the findings 
of the included studies 
clear, including 
methods for 






YES: Methods used clearly reported 
PARTIALLY: Some reporting on 
methods but lack of clarity 
NO: Nothing reported on methods 
N/A: If no studies/no data 
Did the review 






 Did the review ensure that included 
studies were similar enough that it made 
sense to combine them, sensibly divide 
the included studies into homogeneous 
groups, or sensibly conclude that it did not 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
make sense to combine or group the 
included studies? 
 Did the review discuss the extent to 
which there were important differences in 
the results of the included studies? 
 If a meta-analysis was done, was the 𝐼2, 
chi square test for heterogeneity or other 
appropriate statistic reported? If no 
statistical test was reported, is a 
qualitative justification made for the use 
of random effects? 
YES: First, second and (if relevant) third 
PARTIALLY: Only first 
NO: Any other 
Were the findings of 
the relevant studies 
combined (or not 
combined) 
appropriately relative 
to the primary 
question the review 






How was the data analysis done? 
 Descriptive only 
 Vote counting based on direction of 
effect 
 Vote counting based on statistical 
significance 
 Description of range of effect sizes 
 Meta-analysis 
 Meta-regression 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 N/A (e.g. no studies or no data) 
How were the studies weighted in the 
analysis? 
 Equal weights (this is what is done 
when vote counting is used) 
 By quality or study design (this is 
rarely done) 
 Inverse variance (this is what is 
typically done in a meta-analysis) 
 Number of participants (sample size) 
 Other, specify: ____ 
 Not clear 
 N/A (e.g. no studies or no data) 
Did the review address unit of analysis 
errors? 
 Yes – took clustering into account in 
the analysis (e.g. used intra-cluster 
correlation coefficient) 
 No, but acknowledged problem of unit 
of analysis errors 
 No mention of issue 
 Not applicable – no clustered trials or 
studies included 
YES: Appropriate table/graph/meta-
analysis, appropriate weights, and unit of 
analysis errors addressed (if relevant) 
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TOPIC POTENTIAL RESPONSES ADDITIONAL DETAILS 
PARTIALLY: Appropriate 
table/graph/meta-analysis, appropriate 
weights, but unit of analysis errors not 
addressed (if relevant) 
NO: If narrative OR vote counting (where 
quantitative analyses would have been 
possible) OR inappropriate reporting of 
table, graph or meta-analyses 
N/A: If no studies/no data 







 The review makes clear which evidence 
is subject to low risk of bias in assessing 
causality (attribution of outcomes to 
intervention), and which is likely to be 
biased, and does so appropriately 
 Where studies of differing risk of bias 
are included, results are reported and 
analysed separately by risk of bias status 
YES: Both criteria should be fulfilled 
(where applicable) 
NO: Criteria not fulfilled 
PARTIALLY: Only one criterion 
fulfilled, or when there is limited 
reporting of quality appraisal (the latter 
applies only when inclusion criteria for 
study design are appropriate) 
N/A: If no studies/no data 
Did the review 
examine the extent to 
which specific factors 
might explain 
differences in the 






 Were factors that the review authors 
considered as likely explanatory factors 
clearly described? 
 Was a “sensible” method used to 




 Meta-analysis by sub-groups 
 Meta-regression 
 Other 
YES: Explanatory factors clearly 
described and appropriate methods used to 
explore heterogeneity 
PARTIALLY: Explanatory factors 
described but for meta-analyses, sub-
group analysis or meta-regression not 
reported (when they should have been) 
NO: No description or analysis of likely 
explanatory factors 
N/A: Too few studies, no important 
differences in the results of the included 
studies, or the included studies were so 
dissimilar that it would not make sense to 
explore heterogeneity of the result 
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Appendix 4. ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE GAP MAPS 
Table A - 3. EGM: Annex 1 and Non-Annex I countries 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 








Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services                    
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance   11 7 56 3 1 2 10 3     3     
Hybrid Pull Mechanism   2                 
Voucher  3 36 21 234 67   3 1   2 1 1   5 1 
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    1 3 1            1  











Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond            2        
Payment for Environmental Services  16  22 100 69   3    6  7 4 1 51 4 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance 1 34 3 37 182 3 18 69 133 13 11  3  5 1  8 4 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 4   2 5 2         1 2  3 2 
Voucher 6 3 6 53 91 3  1 19    1  1     
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    1 16   2 12    1       
Other  1  3 7 2   11    2     2  
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Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Multi-country or multi-region/global studies not included. PES = Payment for 
environmental services; AMC = Advance market commitment; P4P = Pay-for-performance; CCT = Conditional cash transfer; SR = systematic review (underlying 
studies not reviewed). Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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Table A - 4. EGM: Regional disaggregation 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond            2        
Payment for Environmental Services  3  3 33 42       4  3 3  28 2 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance  12 1 14 73 1  11 27 3 5  2   1  7 1 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher   1 6 3   1            
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services    2                
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance     18   1  1          
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher    4 5               
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    




 Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
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OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Payment for Environmental Services  10  1 43 11   2    2  3 1 1 25 2 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance    1 13   7 11 3 1        3 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 3    4             3 2 
Voucher 2 1  21 32 3   15    1       
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)     1               





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services                    
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance  1 2  5  2 1 17         1  
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher     3               
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services                    
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance   11 7 42 3 1 1 10 2     3     
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OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism   2                 
Voucher  3 36 16 228 67   3 1   2 1 1   5 1 
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    1 3 1            1  





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services                    
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance 1 12  2 18 2  3 6 1 4    4     
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher 1 1  6 26               
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)     7               





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services  3  16 24 16   1    1  1   1  
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance  9  20 69  16 47 72 6 1  1  1     
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 1   2 1 2         1 2    
Voucher 3 1 5 21 28    4      1     
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    3 8   2 12    1       
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OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 



















Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services     1 2         2    1 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance     3   1 2    1       
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher     3               
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    33 67 9  9 1      7   4 2 
Other  2   1          1   1  
Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Multi-country or multi-region/global studies not included. PES = Payment for 
environmental services; AMC = Advance market commitment; P4P = Pay-for-performance; CCT = Conditional cash transfer; SR = systematic review (underlying 
studies not reviewed). Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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Table A - 5. EGM: Least developed countries (LDCs) only 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 





Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services  5  17 25 19   1    1  1   3  
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance  14  25 78 1 16 50 80 7 1  1  5     
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher 3  5 10 29   1       1     
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)     14   2 12    1       
Other  1  3 1    4    1       
Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Multi-country or multi-region/global studies not included. PES = Payment for 
environmental services; AMC = Advance market commitment; P4P = Pay-for-performance; CCT = Conditional cash transfer; SR = systematic review (underlying 
studies not reviewed). Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
  
- Evidence review on results-based payments: Evidence gap map and intervention heat map - 
60  |  ©IEU 
Table A - 6. EGM: Sector-specific disaggregation (for top three sectors) 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 








Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services     3               
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance 1 33 3 42 214 1 18 68 137 10 7  2  8   7 4 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism   2                 
Voucher 6 5 31 64 213 38  1 5 1   1  1   2  
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    32 58 5  11 13    1     1 1 























Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond            2        
Payment for Environmental Services  16  22 101 67   3    7  9 4 1 54 5 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance     4               
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 4   2 5 2         1 2  3 2 
Voucher                    
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    










Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
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OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Payment for Environmental Services  3    3              
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance  1 11 1 21  1 3 8 6          
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher 3  11 9 107 19   17    3 1 1   1 1 
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    3 11          7     
Other                    
Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Multi-country or multi-region/global studies not included. PES = Payment for 
environmental services; AMC = Advance market commitment; P4P = Pay-for-performance; CCT = Conditional cash transfer; SR = systematic review (underlying 
studies not reviewed). Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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Table A - 7. EGM: RBP Agent 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 


















Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services  16  21 101 71   3    7  9 4 1 50 3 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance 1 19  15 150 5 8 10 67 13 10  3   1  7 1 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 3    4             3 2 
Voucher 6 6 42 74 326 70  1 18 1   3 1 2   5 1 
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    35 78 8  10 13    1  7   2 2 


























 Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond            2        
Payment for Environmental Services  1               1   
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance  15 14 36 135 3 17 57 109 7 6  3  8 1  1  
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 1  2 2 1 2         1 2    
Voucher    3 11    17     1 1     
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)     12        1       











Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
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OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Payment for Environmental Services    8 1 2       3  1 3 1 3  
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance     2    2      1     
Hybrid Pull Mechanism                    
Voucher      1              
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    
Other                    
Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Multi-country or multi-region/global studies not included. PES = Payment for 
environmental services; AMC = Advance market commitment; P4P = Pay-for-performance; CCT = Conditional cash transfer; SR = systematic review (underlying 
studies not reviewed). Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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Table A - 8. EGM: RBP beneficiary 
OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 


















Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
Payment for Environmental Services  9  22 99 70   3    6  9 4  44 3 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance 1 34 14 44 241 6 19 71 145 16 11  4  8 1  7 4 
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 1  2 2 1 2         1 2    
Voucher 6 6 42 74 328 70  1 22 1   3 1 2   5 1 
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)    37 86 10  11 13    1  7   5 2 


























 Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond            2        
Payment for Environmental Services     1          2   2  
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance      2  1 7 1 4  1  3 1  1  
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 1   2 1 2         1 2    
Voucher                    
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    











Supply Grand Challenge                    
Impact Bond                    
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OUTCOMES/OUTPUTS 
INTERVENTIONS 
BENEFICIARIES SERVICE PROVIDERS INVESTOR/SYSTEM-WIDE 
S 
A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R 
Payment for Environmental Services  10  8 46 9       5  5 3  16 2 
Advance Market Commitment                    
Pay-for-performance     15   5 6    1  1     
Hybrid Pull Mechanism 3    4             3 2 
Voucher   1  31 14              
Demand Conditional Cash Transfer (SRs only)                    
Other  2   1        1  1   2  
Notes: Each cell indicates the relevant count of intervention/outcome records extracted from studies/systematic reviews included in the evidence review. A study may 
report more than one record. Maximum value indicated in white font colour. Multi-country or multi-region/global studies not included. PES = Payment for 
environmental services; AMC = Advance market commitment; P4P = Pay-for-performance; CCT = Conditional cash transfer; SR = systematic review (underlying 
studies not reviewed). Column titles indicated below: 
Beneficiary level Investor/system-wide level 
A Awareness of goods and services L Investment risk 
B Acceptability of goods and services M Financial or economic return on investment 
C Access to goods and services N Total aid amount 
D Consumption of goods and services O Aid effectiveness 
E Final outcomes: Sector-specific P Market creation or expansion 
F Final outcomes: Socioeconomic Q Policy change or reform 
  R Other investor or systemic outcomes 
Service provider level   
G Management/investment in capital, marketing, and operations S Unintended consequences 
H Innovation/supply of goods and services   
I Quality of goods and services   
J Other output changes   
K Enterprise-level outcomes   
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Appendix 5. EXTRACTING PROJECT-LEVEL DATA FOR 
INTERVENTION HEAT MAP 
In this appendix, we describe our approach for extracting project-level intervention and financial 
data from the funding documentation for GCF projects that use RBP modalities. We also highlight 
key assumptions made during this process to identify (a) the share of the total project budget 
approved to be disbursed using results-based modalities and (b) the specific outcomes targeted by 
underlying RBP interventions when these details are unclear. 
1) FP019: Priming Financial and Land-Use Planning Instruments to Reduce Emissions 
from Deforestation (Ecuador) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp019 
− Results-based funding allocation: Project sub-components 2.1 (“Incentives and capacity-
building for sustainable production through support for production kits”) and 3.1 
(“Incentive payments through Ministerio del Ambiente y Agua’s [MAE] Socio Bosque 
Programme [SBP] project portfolio to predetermined areas and beneficiaries”) provide 
results-based incentive payments to targeted beneficiaries 
+ Objective of sub-component 2.1: “Provide an economic incentive to support livestock 
producers during the transition to more sustainable production, in order to offset the 
reduction of income expected during the transition from a conventional to sustainable 
process, thus allowing the new production system to grow and consolidate while 
improving farmers’ living conditions. This incentive takes the form of a direct 
payment to the producer to compensate for the loss of income during the transition 
period, until the production system becomes economically viable and sustainable.” 
+ Objective of sub-component 3.1: “To support the expansion of SBP outside of its 
former areas of intervention, specifically in areas that are under threat of 
deforestation.”14 
− RBP-allocated amount: USD 17,025,518 
+ Sub-component 2.1: USD 9,257,518 
+ Sub-component 3.1: USD 7,768,000 
− RBP type: Payments for ecosystem services 
− Outcomes: Based on the description of the relevant subcomponent objectives, we assumed 
the total RBP-allocated amount is equally distributed to target: (a) beneficiary-level 
socioeconomic outcomes, (b) service-provider-level market creation/expansion, and (c) 
investor-level/system-wide other outcomes (such as mitigation). 
2) FP062: Poverty, Reforestation, Energy and Climate Change (PROEZA) (Paraguay) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp062 
− Results-based funding allocation: Activity 1.7 (“Make environmental conditional cash 
transfer [E-CCT] payments to beneficiaries”) provides results-based incentive payments to 
targeted beneficiaries 
 
14 The funding documentation describes SBP as follows: “SBP provides financial incentives to individual and community 
landowners who voluntarily commit to conserve native forests for a 20-year period. Since 2008, SBP has signed 
agreements covering an area of 1.4 million ha of tropical forests. It is expected to add approximately 200,000 ha of forest 
per year until 2020. Additionally, SBP includes incentives for restoration and sustainable forest management. SBP 
invested about USD 6.2 million in 2015 in financial incentives to individual and community landowners; however, its 
geographical scope is still limited and needs to be scaled-up and better coordinated with ATPA actions.” 
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+ Relevant project objective: “The project will improve the environmental and social 
resilience of these families, offering them technical support and economic incentives 
to establish climate-smart agroforestry production systems and/or multifunctional 
‘Close-to-Nature’ planted forests (CTNPF) on their land (average area of 0.8 ha per 
family), totalling approximately 13,940 ha. The project will offer 6 proven 
agroforestry climate-smart production systems that combine income generation with 
environmental protection…” 
− RBP-allocated amount for Activity 1.7: USD 2,395,163 
− Outcomes: Based on the description of the project objective, we assumed the total RBP-
allocated amount is equally distributed to target: (a) beneficiary-level socioeconomic 
outcomes, (b) beneficiary-level sector-specific outcomes (such as resilience), and (c) 
investor-level/system-wide other outcomes (such as mitigation). 
3) FP067: Building climate resilience of vulnerable and food insecure communities through 
capacity strengthening and livelihood diversification in mountainous regions of 
Tajikistan (Tajikistan) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp067 
− Results-based funding allocation: Project Component 2 (“Resilience building at household 
and community level through diversification of livelihoods and market access”) aims to 
use CCT-based approaches to incentivize investments in local infrastructure upgrades 
(namely, “small scale agricultural and rural infrastructure assets that benefit their 
communities and halt land degradation”). In addition, the documentation notes specifically 
that “all the participating communities of the project have already been identified. Each 
beneficiary will receive a total transfer of USD 31 over the 4 years” and indicates that 
there will be a total of 50,000 direct beneficiaries. 
− RBP-allocated amount: USD 1,550,000 (that is, USD 31 per direct beneficiary). 
− Outcomes: Based on the project’s focus on incentivizing infrastructure investments that 
increase community-level resilience, we assumed the total RBP-allocated amount is 
equally distributed to target: (a) beneficiary-level socioeconomic outcomes and (b) 
beneficiary-level sector-specific outcomes. 
4) FP117: Implementation of the Lao PDR Emission Reductions Programme through 
improved governance and sustainable forest landscape management (Lao PDR) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp117 
− Results-based funding allocation: Table 4 in the funding documentation indicates that a 
total of EUR 2,000,000 of performance-based payments will be delivered through the 
project to incentivize adoption of “‘white list’ good agricultural practices (GAPs) such as 
intercropping, mulching, no-tillage”. In addition, the documentation notes that the term 
“performance-based payments is somewhat artificial. Upfront payments will be issued on 
an annual basis. This means that, if continued funding is required, the beneficiary will be 
required to submit a new funding request. This provides an opportunity for the NPMU to 
assess beneficiary performance to date and, if needed, to stipulate corrective actions or to 
withhold subsequent payments. Thus, even for upfront payments there is a performance-
based element.” 
− RBP-allocated amount: EUR 3,481,250 (USD 4,073,062.5). 
+ Assumption: Based on the description of the results-based funding allocation, in 
addition to EUR 2,000,000 indicated as “performance-based payments”, we assumed 
that 50 per cent of the total project budget indicated as “upfront payments” in Table 4 
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of the funding documentation will also be delivered using results-based modalities. 
We assumed EUR 1 = USD 1.17. 
− Outcomes: Based on the project’s focus on incentivizing infrastructure investments that 
increase sustainability, productivity and resilience of land-use practices, we assumed the 
total RBP-allocated amount is equally distributed to target: (a) beneficiary-level 
socioeconomic outcomes and (b) beneficiary-level sector-specific outcomes. 
5) FP125: Strengthening the resilience of smallholder agriculture to climate change-induced 
water insecurity in the Central Highlands and South-Central Coast regions of Vietnam 
(Vietnam) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp125 
− Results-based funding allocation: Project sub-activities 1.4.3 and 2.1.4 incentivize up to 
8,621 farmers to make investments in climate-resilient agricultural practices, inputs and 
infrastructure through the provision of redeemable vouchers that partly subsidize 
associated costs. These vouchers are provided to targeted beneficiaries conditional on 
successful completion of courses within the project’s Farmer Field Schools programme 
(Activity 2.1). 
− RBP-allocated amount: As sub-activity-specific budget data are unavailable, we calculate 
the amount to be disbursed through the provision of a combination of conditional cash 
transfers and vouchers by assuming that each of the project’s sub-activities is assigned an 
equal share of the relevant activity-level budget amount: 
+ Activity 1.4 (USD 4,468,867) consists of four sub-activities, which implies that sub-
activity 1.4.3 is allocated USD 1,117,216.75 
+ Activity 2.1 (USD 12,039,312) consists of five sub-activities, which implies that sub-
activity 2.1.4 is allocated USD 2,407,862.40 
+ Therefore, total RBP-allocated amount is USD 3,525,079.15 
− Outcomes: Based on the project’s focus on incentivizing infrastructure investments that 
increase resilience, we assumed the total RBP-allocated amount targets beneficiary-level 
sector-specific outcomes. 
6) FP146: Bio-CLIMA: Integrated climate action to reduce deforestation and strengthen 
resilience in BOSAWÁS and Rio San Juan Biospheres (Nicaragua) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/fp146 
− Results-based funding allocation: Project funding from the GCF is allocated using senior 
loans and grants as funding instruments. The funding documentation notes that “[t]he GCF 
grant…would be invested mainly in incentives for small-holders and indigenous 
communities at the agricultural frontier to transform their agricultural practices and restore 
landscapes…” Specifically, the role of project output 1.2.2 is to “[p]rovide financial 
incentives to communities for sub-projects submitted according to Operational Manuals.” 
− RBP-allocated amount: USD 12,100,000 allocated for project output 1.2.2 (Table 10a). 
− Outcomes: Based on the project’s focus on landscape restoration, we assumed the total 
RBP-allocated amount targets system-wide “other” outcomes. 
7) SAP002: Climate services and diversification of climate sensitive livelihoods to empower 
food insecure and vulnerable communities in the Kyrgyz Republic (Kyrgyz Republic) 
− Project documentation available at https://www.greenclimate.fund/project/sap002 
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− Results-based funding allocation: As part of Component 2 (“Livelihood strengthening and 
diversification to increase the adaptive capacity of vulnerable groups and build community 
resilience”), up to 102,000 beneficiaries will receive a total conditional cash transfer of 
USD 30.50, conditional on project participation and contribution to establishing adaptation 
measures/infrastructure (such as rehabilitating assets) and improving community-level 
adaptive capacity. 
− RBP-allocated amount: USD 3,111,000 (USD 30.50 per beneficiary). 
− Outcomes: Based on the project’s focus on incentivizing infrastructure investments that 
increase adaptive capacity, we assumed the total RBP-allocated amount targets 
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